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RECENT CASES
BANKRUPTCY-POWER OF STATE AND NATION-NATIONAL LAW SuPREm--
HuRLEY v. DEVLIN, 151 FED. gig.-Held, that Congress may pass laws making
such distribtion of bankrupt's property, dividing it among his creditors, his
wife and the bankrupt, as seems proper to it, without interference from state
laws.
A state legislature has power to pass bankrupt and insolvency laws, so
long as they do not interfere with any national law on the subject, and do
not impair the obligation of a contract. Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122; Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wall. 213; Baldwin v. Hale, i Wall. 223; Hoyle
v. Zacharie, 6 Peters 635. When Congress passes a bankrupt law any state
law concerning the same matter becomes suspended. Ex parte Eames, Fed.
Cases, No. 4237; In re Reynolds, 8 R. I. 485. One case held that a state
could not pass bankrupt laws, even in the absence of action by Congress.
Golden v. Prince, Fed. Cas. No. 55o9. It is now recognized that a state may
pass an insolvent law, but it is superseded by national bankrupt law in so
far as they conflict. Appeal of Geery, 43 Conn. 289; Fisk v. Montgomery, 21
La. Ann. 446. Congress has power to destroy a lien on the property of a
bankrupt. In re Jordan, Fed. Cas. No. 7514; Bank of Columbia v. Over-
street, 73 Ky. 148. American bankrupt laws apply to any debtor; English
apply only to fraudulent traders. In re Klein, Fed. Cas. No. 7865. The
bankrupt's assignee is not entitled to bankrupt's wife's choses in action not
reduced to possession. In re Snow, Fed. Cas. No. 13,142. Nor is he entitled
to property of a bankrupt's minor children, acquired by their endeavors, and
standing in their name. Ex parte Tebbets, Fed. Cas. No. 13,816.
CARRIERS-FREE PASSES-INJURY TO PASSENGERS-LIABILITY.-BRADBURN
V. WHATCOM COUNTY RY. & LIGHT CO., 88 PAC. 1020 (WAsH.).--eld, that
a street railroad carrying a police officer free of charge as required by a
municipal ordinance is liable for injuries sustained by him through the negli-
gence of its motorman in charge of the car, though the ordinance is in con-
flict with Constitution, article 2, section 39, and article 12, section 20, pro-
hibiting the granting of passes to officers.
CARRIERS-INJuRY TO PASSENGERS-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES.-CLEVELAND,
C., C. & ST. L. R. Co. v. OFFUTT, 104 S. W. 359 (KY.).-Where a pas-
senger was injurAd in a collision between the car on which he was riding
and the engine of another train, when both trains were moving slowly and
the engine merely grazed the side of the car, and the cause of the accident
appeared to be an error of judgment as to the space within which the incom-
ing train would stop or to its arriving a few seconds before expected, held,
that the circumstances were insufficient to justify the award of exemplary
damages, even though the plaintiff claimed the jar threw him against the arm
of the seat, and injured his hip and back, Carroll and Nunn, JJ., dissenting.
Exemplary damages may be given when a personal injury has been caused
by the gross carelessness of a railroad company, in the management of its
trains. Hopkins v. The Atil. & St. Law. R. R., 36 N. H. 9. While such dam-
ages will not be given to a passenger who has been injured in a collision,
caused by the negligence of the employees of a railroad, unless it is the result
of their reckless indifference. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Arms, et al.,
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91 U. S. 489. And for an error in judgment the employers are not liable for
punitive damages. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Ferrel, 7 Ky. Law. Rep. 6o7.
But where, with full knowledge of the approach of a passenger train, or the
time of its approach, the employees of the company left a switch open, and as
a result, there was a collision, causing the injury of a passenger, there was
such a degree of neglect as to authorize an instruction -as to punitive dam-
ages. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Kingman, 35 S. W. 264 (Ky.).
CARRIERS-PASSENGERS--COMMUNICATION OF CONTAGIOUS DisEAsE-PRox-
IMATE CAus-MIssOuRr, K. & T. Rx,. Co. v. RANEY, 99 S. W. 589 (TEX.).-
Held, that the act of a railway ticket agent infected with smallpox in expos-
ing himself to plaintiff, who purchased tickets from him, was the proxi-
mate cause of plaintiff's wife contracting the disease, where plaintiff con-
tracted it and communicated it to her.
CARRIERS-REFUSAL TO HoNOR TICKETS-DAMAGES--MENTAL SUFERING.
-ST. Louis SOUTHWESTERN Ry. Co. OF TEXAS V. CRANE, 102 S. W. 739
(TEx.)-Held, that the defendant was not liable for the mental suffering
and humiliation arising from the fact that plaintiff was compelled to borrow
money from her brother with which to pay her fare, her ticket represented
by defendant as good on connecting line to destination, being refused.
At Common Law mental suffering must be connected with physical injury
or other element of damage to person or property. Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L.
C. 577; TV. U. Tel. Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748. Federal Courts hold the
same doctrine. Chase v. W. U. Tel. Co, 44 Fed. Rep. 554- In So. Relle
v. W U. Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308, mental suffering was not natural consequence,
yet damages were allowed, but this decision was overruled in conformity
with the general rule of law that injury complained of must be proximate
result of negligence or wanton act. Stuart v. W. U. Tel. Co., 66 Tex. 580;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Bigham, go Tex. 223; Hale, Damages, 39 and 40.
This rule, consistently adhered to by Texas courts, is supported in Dawson
v. Louisville N. R. Co., 6 Ky. Law Reports 668, and in Hoffman v. Northern
Pacific R. Co., 47 N. W. S12 (Minn.). It was held that although money had
to be borrowed to pay fare the mental suffering occasioned thereby was too
remote to afford a basis for damages.
COMMERCE-INTERSTATE COMmERcE-SUBJEcTS OF STATE TAXATION-
LoviRIN & BROwN Co. v. TANSIL Er AL., 102 S. W. 72 (TENN.).-Held, that
where goods are shipped in accordance with a general order, by a foreign mer-
cantile corporation to a salesman in another state, in barrels and boxes which
are opened by the salesman, and the goods separated and arranged for deliv-
ery to purchasers that such corporation was not engaged in interstate com-
merce, but as a retail merchant, where transactions were made, and so liable
to privilege taxes imposed upon local merchants.
Interstate Commerce is regulated by Congress. Const. Art. I. Section 8,
section 3. Goods brought into a state in original package and remaining in
that condition are within the protection of the clause. Bradford v. Stevens,
io Gray 379; Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 335; Schollenberger v. Penn., 171 Pa. i.
An original package,within the meaning of the law of interstate commerce, is.
the package delivered by the importer to the carrier, at the initial point of
shipment, in the exact conditon in which it was shipped. Guckenheimer v.
Sellers, 81 Fed. Rep. 997. In the so-called liquor cases an attempt was made
to evade state laws by shipping bottles in an open box and selling the sep-
arate bottles as original packages, but the courts held that if anything was an
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original package it was the box. State of South Dakota v. Chapman, lo L. R.
A. 432; a like conclusion was reached in regard to cigarette packages,
McGregor v. Cone, 104 Iowa 465. Accordingly, when goods are so acted
upon that they have become incorporated or mixed with the general mass of
property within the state, they become subject to state taxation. Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-ARMY-HABFAS CORPU.-Ex PARTE SCHLAFFER,
154 FED. 921.-Held, that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment for
sixty days on a soldier, by the authorities of a city for a violation of a city
ordinance, where the act charged did not result in nor threaten any injury to
person or property, is unwarranted, and the soldier will be discharged on a
writ of habeas corpus on petition of his commanding officer.
In times of peace a soldier can only be tried and imprisoned by civil
authorities for a violation of a law of the land. Drunkenness is no such
offence, although made a misdemeanor by municipal ordinance. Ex parte
Bright, I Utah, 145. When a man becomes a soldier he goes from the control
of the civil authorities to that of military, even to giving up his right to trial
by jury. Ex parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2. Control of Federal government over
the regular army is plenary and exclusive. Tarble's Case, 13 Wallace 397.
A city can not arraign soldiers for violations of municipal ordinances; it can
arrest them to prevent further damage, but must hand them over to their mil-
itary officers. Ex parte Bright, supr.a. Where a person is brought before a
Circuit Court, on writ of habeas corpus, it should not discharge the pris-
oner, except in case of great emergency, but should leave the case for the
state court to decide, after which the prisoner may appeal to the Supreme
Court on a writ of error. Baker v. Grice, 169 U. S. 284; Whitten v. Tomlin-
son, 16o U. S. 231. But it may discharge him in case of great emergency.
Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241. As an extreme example, see In re Neagle,
135 U. S. I.
CoNsTiTuTioziAL LAW-STATE STATUTE-DESECRATION OF NATIONAL FLAG.
-HALTER V. NEBRASKA. 205 U. S. 34; 27 SuP. CT. 419.-Held, that the statute
of Nebraska preventing and punishing the desecration of the flag of the United
States and prohibiting the sale of articles upon which there is a representa-
tion of the flag for advertising purposes is not unconstitutional either as
depriving the owner of such articles of his property without due process of
law, or as denying him the equal protection of the laws because of the excep-
tion from the operation of the statute of newspapers, periodicals or books
upon which the flag may be represented if disconnected from any advertise-
ment.
CORPORATONs-OFFicERs-LABILITY TO CORPORATIONS-INDIVIDUAL BEN-
EFITS.-RxIcxKERT v. WrTE, 05o.N. Y. SuPP. 653. Where a corporation officer
purchases goods for the corporation from a partnership in which, unknown
to the corporation, he holds an interest, held, that the corporate officer must
account to the corporation for the profits derived.
Officers of a corporation occupy a fiduciary relation towards the corpo-
ration, Marshall on Private Corporations, .section 376, and they cannot there-
fore with respect to the same matter act for -themselves and for it,. Wardell
Z'. Railroad Co.,. 5O3 U..S., 651. Thus in Grey v. Lewis, L. K. 8 Ch. App. 1o35,
and Hersey v. Vesey, 24 Me. 9, it is declared that a director or promoter can-
not make a secret profit out of his transactions with the corporation; and it
is held that where a director makes such. profit, he must 'account for said
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profit to the coi'poration. Cook on Stock and Stockholders, Sections 649, 65o;
The Liquidators, etc., Assn. v. Coleman, L. R. 6 H. L. i89, reversing L. R. 6
Ch. 558, where it was declared, that a director might have an intirest in buii-
ness, brought by him, to the corporation; and that he could retain a com-
mission. And as to a promoter who for a consideration secretly agrees with
a patentee to form a company to buy his patents, and being elected a director,
votes for the resolution to purchase, the company'may recover of him his
secret profits. Yale Gas-Stove Co. v. Wilcox, 64 Conn. ioi. Although ordi-
narily the law frowns upon the contracts made by a director of a corpora-
tion in their representative character with themselves as private persons, such
contracts are not necessarily void, In re Lafferty, 2 Pa. Dist. 1. 215, and they
are valid, if fair, free from fraud and for the benefit of the corporation.
Savage v. Madelina Farmer's Warehouse Co., io8 N. W. (Minn.) 296; Twin
Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 9i U. S. 587.
CRIMINAL LAW-CONFESSIONS-INDU EMENTS.-STATE V. SHERMAN, 90
PAC. 981 (Mow.).-Held, that confessions to be inadmissible need not have
been procured by inducements held out by one in authority, but it is enough
that inducements were held out by a private person in the presence of one in
authority.
A confession obtained through inducements held out by a person, not in
authority, is admissible: Reynolds Ev., Section 25; People v. Barker, 6 Mich.
277; Price v. State, io Ohio St. 418; contra, that confession must be voluntary
no matter to whom it is made: Rex v. Dunn, 4 C. & P. 543; Rex v. Slaughter,
4 C. & P. 544. Inducements held out in the presence of an officer have the
same effect as if held out by the officer: where husbahd, in the presence of an
officer, held out inducements to his wife, Regina v. Taylor, 8 C. & P. 733;
where innkeeper, in the presence of officer, held out inducements to the pris-
oner, Rex v. Pountney, 7 C. & P. 302. Some courts have gone so far as to
say that a confession obtained through the threats of a third party and acci-
dentally overheard by one in authority is not admissible, Hall v. State, 65
Ga. 36; but the weight of authority is the other way. Wharton on Ev. in
Crim. Cases, Section 644; Commonwealth v. Goodwin, I86 Pa. 218.
EJECTMENT-POSSESSION OF DEFENDANT-STRETCHING WIRE ABOVE SUR-
FAcF--BuTLER V. FRONTIER TELEPHONE CO., 79 N. E. 716 (N. Y.).-Held, that
ejectment will lie where a telephone wire is stretched across plaintiff's prem-
ises, about thirty feet above the surface of the ground, which is not supported
by any structure standing on the premises, plaintiff being the owner of the
space above his premises and entitled to its exclusive possession.
ELEcrRIcrrY-DFEcrvE WIRING BY CUSTOMER-SHUTTING OFF CURRENT.
-BENSON v. AMERICAN ILLUMINATING Co., io2 N. Y. SupP. 2o6.-Held, that
where, after an elective company has wired an office for light, the customer
makes defective connections of other wires with the wiring, causing danger
of fires, and. refuses to remedy the same, the company which, in case of fire
therefrom, would be liable for damages to third persons, may shut off the
current, without liability to the customer therefor.
EVIDENCE-BEST AND SECONDARY.-COLE V. ELLWOOD POWER Co., 65 ATL.
678 (PA.).-Held, that where an original paper and a carbon copy are made
on a typewriter at the same time, signed by the same person, and executed
in the same manner, both may be considered originals, and either one is
admissible in evidence without notice to produce the other.
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EVIDENCE-ENTRIES IN PRIVATE MEMORANDU.-BURKE v. BAKER, 8o N. E.
11033 (N. Y.).-Held, that in an action by executrix for services rendered
by her testator, entries in the diaries of testator relating to services alleged
to have been rendered defendants were inadmissible.
While such an admission is justified on the ground of necessity, or as
best evidence, Kendall v. Field, 14 Me. 30; or where made in regular course
by deceased clerk, Bacon v. Vaughn, 34 Vt. 73; or even where clerk is alive,
yet not produced, Cummings v. Fullan, 13 Vt. 434, it was distinctly decided
in Lapharn v. Kelley, 35 Vt. 195, on thorough examination of all authorities,
that such an entry in a pass-book of like character was not admissible as "nde-
pendent evidence and the rule seems well established that private memoranda
made for preserving a knowledge of a fact are never admissible as inde-
pendent evidence in favor of persons who made them. Godding v. Orcutt, 44
Vt. 54; Lawrence v. Baker, 5 Wend. 301; Glover v. Hunnewell, 6 Pick. 22;
Haven v. Wendall, ii N. H. 112; Storys Confl. of Laws, sections 526-7.
EVIDENCE-ExPeRTs-HYoTHETICAL QuasTioN.-Crry OF CHIcAGO V.
DIDIER, 8i N. E. 698 (ILL.). Where a medical expert was asked a hypothet-
ical question based upon assumed facts and the assumed truth of testimony of
witnesses for the plaintiff, offered at the trial, held, that the question was not
objectionable in form.
Courts as a rule entertain an aversion to expert testimony, but consider it
necessary in many cases. Tulles v. Rankin, 6 N. D. 44. The courts have
adopted different rules as to what shall constitute a hypothetical question.
In Mayo v. Wright, 63 Mich. 32, it was said that the question must not con-
tain statements outside of any testimony given previously in the trial, but
this was carried farther in Elgin A. & S. Traction Co. v. Wilson, 217 Ill. 47,
where it was said that a physician could express an opinion upon information
gained in the exercise of his professional duties with the patient. Neverthe-
less, where the question is based upon conflicting testimony, it will not be
admitted, Smith v. Hickenbottom, 57 Iowa, 733; and it should embody sub-
stantially all the- facts relating to the subject upon which the question is
asked. Serm v. Southern Ry. Co., 108 Mo. 142. Also it may be based upon the
hypothesis of all the evidence, or on a hypothesis framed of certain facts
assumed to have been proven. Goutier v. Hartman, 3 Colo. 53.
EXEMPTIoNs-BiLL OF-COMPELLING TRIAL JUDGE TO AcT-MANDAMUS.-
STATE EX REL. COLUMBUS ST. RY. & LIGHT Co. v. DEUPREE, 81 N. E. 678
(IND.). Where a judge refused to sign a bill of exceptions on the ground
that there was no shorthand reporter during the trial, held, that mandamus
would lie to compel him to act on the bill, and if correct, to sign it.
It is a well settled rule of law, that a judge must sign a bill of excep-
tions, if it is correct. State ex rel. Sneed v. Hall, 3 Coldwell (Tenn.) 255.
And if they do not correctly state the truth of the case, it is the duty of the
judge, with the aid of counsel, to setttle the bill, Page v. Colton, 30 Grattan
(Va.) 415; though a judge cannot be compelled to sign a bill of exceptions
which he alleges is untrue, State ex rel. Wittenbrock v. Wickham, 65 Mo.
634; or one which he believes does not contain the truth, People ex rel. Vos-
burgh v. Jamison, 40 Ill. 93; and the power of determining whether the bill is
correct or not, is vested in the judge, State v. Todd, 4 Hammond (Ohio) 351,
and when the judge refuses to sign because he says it does not state the truth
of the case, which the relator traverses, an issue of fact is presented, to be
determined upon the evidence, Collins et al. v. Christian, 92 Va. 731; but the
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instrument must show a fair and bona fide statement of the case. Pacific
Land Asso. et al v. Hunt, i05 Cal. 202.
HIGHWAYS-WATER MAINS-ADDITIONAL SERVITUDE.-BALTIMORE Co.
WATER AND ELECTRIC Co. v. DuRREUm, 66 ATL. (MD.). 439.-Held, that the
only right the public acquires in an ordinary country highway, the fee of
which is in the abutting owner, is the easement of passage and its incidents,
and the laying of water pipes therein is an additional servitude.
In the use of streets for public purposes the rule is said to be that the
rights of the abutter, as between him and the public, are substantially the
same whether the fee is in him subject to the public use or is in the city in
trust for street purposes. Barney v. Koebuck, 94 U. S. 324-340; Mollandin
v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 14 Fed. 394. The law presumes that when men lay
out land and dedicate it to the public for street purposes they contemplate
the use of the street for all such usages as may arise in the course of time.
Magee v. Overshiner, I5o Ind. 127; Cater v. No. Tel. Ex. Co., 6o Minn. 539.
It has been held in some cases that when the public acquires a street, it may
be used for all street purposes consistent with the proper use of a street.
Julia Bid. Asso. v. Bell Tel. Co., 88 Mo. 258; Parsons v. Waterville and Oak-
land St. Ry., 1o1 Me. 173. A distinction has been recognized, however,
between the use of rural or country highways and the use of streets in cities
and towns. Kincaid v. Ind. Nat. Gas Co., 124 Ind. 577; Penn. Ry. Co. v. Mont.
Co. Pass. R. Co., 167 Pa. St. 62. Contra, Lincoln v. Comm., 164 Mass. I;
Hardman v. Cabot, 7 L. R. A. (new series) 506. These courts hold that in the
ordinary country highway the easement is one of passage merely. Sterling's
Appeal, InI Pa. St. 35; Mackenzie's Case, 74 Md. 47. And does not include
the permanent and exclusive appropriation of any part thereof by the laying
of water pipes, gas pipes, and the like. Consumers Gas Trust Co. v. Hunt-
singer, 14 Ind. App. 156; Ward v. Triple St. Nat. Gas Co., 25 Ky. L. Rep.
x16.
MASTER AND SERVANT-NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT-SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT.
-BAMBERG V. INTERNATIONAL Ry. Co., io3 N. Y. SuPP. 297. Plaintiff, a passen-
ger on an open street car, was injured by the pole of a wagon belonging
to defendant being driven into the car in a collision at a street crossing. The
driver of the wagon disobeyed instructions, and permitted a boy to drive
the team prior to the collision. The boy drove the team at a trot toward
the crossing, and, seeing he was unable to stop in time to prevent the col-
lision, called to the driver, who seized the reins, which had been at all times
within his reach, but was unable to stop in time. Held, that the boy at the
time of the accident, though not within the employ of the defendants, was
engaged in their business, and that they were therefore liable, both for his
negligence and the negligence of the driver.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-POLICE PowER-TRADING STAMPS.-CITY AND
COUNTY OF DENVER V. FRuEAUFF, 88 PAC. 389 (CoL).-Held, that an ordi-
nance forbidding any gift enterprise, defined to include the giving of any
trading stamp or other device which shall entitle the purchaser of property
to receive from any person or corporation other than the vendor any prop-
erty other than that actually sold, is not justifiable as an exercise of the
police power.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-PUBLIC IMPROVEMENTS-SUFFICIENCY OF BIDS.
-STIMSON v. HANLEY, go PAC. 945 (CAL.).-Held, that where bids were
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invited for the paving of a street as one work, bids for less than the whole
work were not in response to the invitation, and might be disregarded.
Contracts to the lowest bidder are governed by statutes and they are
designed rather for the benefit and protection of the public than the bidder.
The State ex rel. State Journal Co. v. McGrath, 9I Mo. 386. Officials vested
with the power usually must award the contract to the person submitting
the lowest bid in response to the invitation, Carter v. Kalloch, 56 Cal. 335;
Dement v. Rokker, 126 Il1. 174. Bids for a contract made up of several sec-
tions must be considered as for an indivisible contract, Santa Rosa Lighting
Co. v. Woodward, I9 Cal. 3o; Vincent v. Ellis, I16 Iowa, 6og. In In re
Mahan, 2o Hun. (N. Y.) 3oi, and Matter of the Emigrant Industrial Savings
Bank, 73 N. Y. 395, it was held that a contract made up of several sections
must be awarded to the lowest bidder for the whole, not to another bidder
who omitted a substantial part of the work to be contracted for.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-STREETs-DUTIES.-MITCHELL V. TELL CITY,
8I N. E. 594 (IND.).-Held, a municipal corporation's duty to keep its streets
and sidewalks reasonably safe for public travel is performed when it has
prepared and maintained a way of sufficient width, which is smooth and
convenient for travel.
It is the duty of a municipal corporation to see that its sidewalks and
streets are reasonably safe only, and not as to preclude all possibility of acci-
dent. City of Rockford v. Hilderbrand, 6i Ill. 155; Town of Centerville v.
Woods et al., 57 Ind. 192. And a city is bound to keep its walks in reason-
able repair for their entire width. City of Atlanta v. Milan, 95 Ga. 135.
But Tritz v. Kansas City, 85 Mo. 632, holds that a city is bound to keep only
so much of its sidewalk in repair as is necessary to render it safe for travel.
But defects in sidewalks and streets must be such that a person using ordi-
nary prudence will incur danger in passing over them. City of Aurora v.
Pulfer, 56 Ill. 27o.
NEGLIGENCE-TELEGRAPH COMPANIES-DELIVERY OF MESSAGE-W. U. T.
Co. v. GAMBLE, ioi S. W. 1166 (TEx.) Where a telegraph company neglected
to deliver a message addressed to one "Gamble," addressee's correct name
being "Gambill," and he being well known in the town, held, that the com-
pany was not relieved of the duty of delivering a message to the addressee.
When the addressee of a telegram is not at the place of address, it is not
sufficient for the company to leave the telegram at the place of address, but
it must use reasonable diligence to find him. W. U. T. Co. v. De Jarles, 8
Tex. Civ. App. iog. So also it was held in the case of V. U. T. Co. v. Wood,
56 Kan. 737, that when the person to whom the message was addressed, was
out of town, so that personal delivery could not be made. it was the duty of
the company to deliver the message either to those in charge of the business,
or to the members of his family at his residence. The law has even been
carried so far" as to say, that even though the telegraph company made an
ineffectual attempt to find the addressee, it is liable, when as a matter of fact,
the addressee lived in the town. W. U. T. Co. v. McKibben, 114 Ind. 511,
and in the case of W. U. T. Co. v. Newhouse, 6 Ind. App. 422, it was held
not sufficient to leave the telegram at the specified address, when the
addressee could have been found by looking in the city directory. The great-
est care must be used in locating the addressee, as in the case of Herran.v.
W. U. T. Co., go Iowa i29, where the telegraph company might have located
the addressee by greater diligence. The court in Pope v. W. U. T. Co., 9 Ill.
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App. 283, said that it would be a limitation upon the duty of the telegraph
company to say that a message need only be delivered at the place where
addressed.
NEGLIGENCE-UNPROTECTED TURNTABLE-INJURY TO CHILD.-THoMPSON
V. BALTIMORE & 0. R. Co., 67 ATL. 768 (PA.). Where a railroad erects on its
own land a turntable, held, that it is under no duty to take special precau-
tion for the safety of children, though the turntable may tend to attract them
and expose them to danger. Mestrezat, J., dissenting.
A landowner is under no obligation to keep his lands safe for a mere
trespasser. Hounsell v. Sinyth, 7 C. B. N. S. 731. From this general doctrine
there was a departure in the famous "turntable cases." In the original of
these, Sioux City, etc., R. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wallace 657, the Supreme Court
of the U. S. decided that a landowner who makes changes on it in the course
of its beneficial use, which tend to attract children and expose them to danger,
is under a duty to take special precaution'for their safety. Where railroad
turntables have been left insecurely fastened, and children have been hurt
while playing on them, the railroad company has been held liable in the fol-
lowing jurisdictions: Minn., Mo., Kan., Ga., Wash., Cal., S. C., and Neb.
The tendency of later decisions is decidedly against the imposition of such a
duty. In Gillespie v. McGowan, iOO Pa. i44, it is said that if such a doctrine
were carried to its logical conclusion it would charge the duty of protection
of children upon every member of the community except the parent. A num-
ber of states support the doctrine that the fact that the trespasser is an infant
of tender years affords no reason for modifying this rule, and charging the
landowner with a duty which does not otherwise exist. The Delaware, etc.,
R. Co. v. Reich, 6i N. J. L. 635. The doctrine of the "turntable cases" has
also been disapproved in N. Y., Va., Mass., N. H., R. I., Mich., W. Va. and
Texas.
NOTES-FORGERY-FRAUD-DECEIT.-BIDDEFORD NAT. BANK v. HILL, 66
ATL. (ME.) 721.-Hld, that where a person, not intending to sign a promis-
sory note, but by fraud and deceit has been tricked into signing an instru-
ment which afterwards proves to be a promissory note, such instrument is a
forgery, although the signature affixed thereto is genuine.
Intent to defraud is the essence of the crime of forgery. State v. Red-
stake, 39 N. J. 365; Comm. v. Henry, 118 Mass. 460. It has been said that
every instrument that fraudulently purports to be what it is not is a forgery
when the falseness relates to a material fact. The Queen v. Ritson, I L. R.
C. C. 2oo; State v. Kattleman, 35 Mo. 105. If a man sign his own name with
the intention that it shall be taken for the name of another of the same name,
it is forgery. Meade v. Young, 4 T. R. 28; Barfield v. State, 29 Ga. 127. A
mere false representation, however, where the signature is not false, is not
sufficient to constitute the crime. Rex v. Story, Russ & Ry., 81. And
where the instrument is genuine and the fraud of defendant consists in hold-
ing himself out as the party who made it, forgery is not committed. The
King v. Hevey, I Leach. (3rd ed.) 268. But if the writing is done for another
and his designs are fraudulent so as to make it forgery if he had written it
himself, the instrument is a forged one. Caulkins v. Whisler, 29 Iowa 495;
People v. Drayton, 4r App. Div. 40. "It is not necesary that the fraudulent
intent should be in the mind of the one whose hand holds the pen.' Comm.
v. Foster, 114 Mass. 311; Gregory v. State, 26 Ohio St. 510.
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SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICS--FAILuRE TO PROVIDE SCHOOL FACILITIES.
-BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FRELINGHUYSEN TP. v. ATWOOD, 65 An.. (N. J.)
g9.-Held, that the failure of a board of education to provide for the trans-
portation of children living remote from the school-house, pursuant to section
I of the school law (P. L. i9o2, p. io8), is not a failure "to provide suitable
school facilities and accommodations," within the meaning of section 120 of
the same act (P. L. p. Iii).
TAXATIoN-PuBmIC LANDS-SALE.-MINT REALTY Co. v. CITY OF PHILA-
DELPHIA ET AL., 66 ATL. 1130 (P.).-Held, where the United States sells
real estate, reserving title to itself, until all payments are made, and condi-
tions performed, such real estate is not taxable until the vendee has made all
the payments and performed all the conditions. Mestrezat and Potter, JJ.,
dissenting.
United States lands are not subject to taxation or private transfer or
ownership, until entry of the purchase which is completed by the patent.
Sands v. Davis, 4o Mich. 14. Although lands entered in the proper land
offices of the United States become subject to taxation from the issuance
of the certificate of entry, and the payment of the purchase price without
regard to the issuance of the patent. Smith v. Hollis, 46 Ark. 17. While
lands on Pawnee Indian reservations sold by the United States partly on
credit, are taxable from date of the sale. Edgington v. Cook, 32 Neb. 551.
And lands purchased from the United States and paid for, are liable to be
taxed, the same resting entirely upon an agreement between the United States
and State, although a patent for the lands has not been given. Astrom et al.
v. Hammond, Fed. Cas. No. 596.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-DIVERSION-STATUTORY PROVISION-CON-
STITUT1ONALITY.-McCARTER v. HUDSON COUNTY WATER Co., 65 ATm. 489
(N. J.).-Held, that the act of May II, 19o5 (P. L. 19o5, p. 461), whereby
it is made unlawful for any persons or corporation to transport through
pipes, conduits, etc., the waters of any fresh-water lake, pond or stream of
this state into any other state is constitutional.
WATERs-RPARIAN OWNERS-USE OF WATER-MONTECITO VALLEY WATER
Co. V. CITY OF SANTA BARBARA ET AL., 90 PAC. 935 (CAL.). Where upper
riparian owner diverted and distributed water to others for irrigating of
otherwise arid lands, held, that a riparian proprietor is not entitled to take
water from a stream for use on land which was valueless for agricultural
purposes.
A riparian owner is not liable for a reasonable use of water passing his
land, whether for his own purposes or for sale to others, and the reasonable-
ness of his use is a question of fact, Gillis v. Chase, 67 N. H. 161; Jones v.
Aqueduct, 62 N. H. 488; Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, that depends upon
the circumstances of every case, Davis v. Getchell, 52 Me. 6o2; Tyler v. Wil-
kinson, 4 Mason 4o1. All waters of a stream may be used for natural pur-
poses that are necessary to man's existence, but only part of the water may
be used for purposes not necessary, as irrigation and manufacturing, Evans
v. Merriweather, 4 IIl. 492; Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127; but riparian owners
cannot, even in thd irrigation of their lands, consume the water to the detri-
ment of riparian proprietovs below, Arnold v. Foot, r2 Wend. 330; Cook v.
Hull, 3 Pick. 269. The use of water for irrigation is an artificial use, not a
natural use, and the natural use must take precedence, Gillett v. Johnson, 30.
Conn. i8o; Wadsworth v. Tillotson, 15 Conn. 366.
